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RUEAHLG/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CARC

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SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING OUTREACH INITIATIVE: INITIAL
MEETING IN ARMENIA

- 1.(U) SUMMARY. In a December 10 session in Yerevan, the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach delegation laid out its preliminary assessment of Armer
- 2.(U) DESCRIPTION OF MEETING.

The U.S. Embassy hosted the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach delegation for a December 10 meeting in Yerevan with a broad-based Armenian delegat

16. The U.S. delegation presented its talking points laying out the preliminary U.S. assessment of Armenia's capabilities to prevent, detect, a

- 15.
- 3.(SBU) ARMENIAN RESPONSE.

The Armenian side generally agreed with the U.S. assessment and provided additional detail about ongoing efforts and additional needs: --Armeni

14. (U) NEXT STEPS.

The U.S. delegation passed an Armenian language version of its talking points as a non-paper. The Armenian delegation agreed to prepare a writt

- 5.(SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS TALKING POINTS FOR INITIAL MEETING WITH ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT ON NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Introduction

-- We,d like to thank you for joining us in this dialogue on combating nuclear smuggling.

-- Let me begin by reviewing what we have in mind for these discussions.

-- As we previously indicated, we would like to conduct a comprehensive exchange of views on Armenia,s anti-nuclear smuggling capabilities and

-- We want to discuss Armenia,s anti-nuclear smuggling abilities across the board, from preventing smuggling to detecting it if it occurs to ef

-- We want this discussion to be a genuine exchange of views; we want to understand your perspective of the situation as well as provide you ou

-- As a result of these initial discussions, we would like to reach a common understanding of Armenia,s capabilities and needs. For that purpos

-- Thus, we will leave our basic points with you at the end of today,s meeting; we ask you to study them carefully and provide us as soon as pc

-- Once that common understanding is achieved, we will come back to Yerevan for a follow-up meeting, in which we will want to develop with you,

-- Subsequently, we will use the list of priority assistance projects to explore with potential donors, both U.S. programs and international sc

-- It is important to highlight that these discussions are not meant to signify the promise of additional assistance from potential donors. How

-- This assistance has been accompanied by commitments from those engaged countries to do what they can on their own to improve their capabilit

-- Our ultimate goal is to determine through mutual cooperation how to most efficiently enhance Armenia,s ability to combat the nuclear smuggli

-- We want to emphasize that our intention in this effort is not to criticize; rather it is to improve the efficiency of our cooperation in str

-- As I indicated, we want to review your capabilities across the board. In this regard, we have gathered some preliminary information from U.S

-- I expect there will be a number of areas where you will be able to improve our understanding or fill in gaps in our information. However, in

-- Now let's turn to the first dimension of combating smuggling, preventing its occurrence. In this area, we understand Armenia,s strengths to

- Security at the Metsamor nuclear power plant appears to be sufficient to prevent unauthorized access to the nuclear material and nuclear wast

- Armenia has worked with the U.S. Department of Energy,s Global Threat Reduction Initiative to improve physical security at several sites wher

- Armenia has developed a registry of radioactive sources and is actively working with U.S. and international partners to improve its nuclear r

- Armenia possesses export control laws that provide a solid legal basis to prevent diversion of nuclear and radioactive materials.

-- We believe Armenia,s capabilities in the area of preventing nuclear trafficking could be best enhanced by focusing on the following elements

- We encourage Armenia to continue its valuable cooperation with both its U.S. and international partners focused on providing security upgrade

- We encourage Armenia to develop a prioritized list of sites that may still hold orphaned radioactive sources, and to work with U.S. and inter

- We appreciate President Kocharian,s public commitment to address the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Agency,s shortage of manpower and insufficie

-- Now let's turn to the area of detecting illicit trafficking. Here, we understand Armenia,s strengths to be as follows:

- Armenia is making important improvements to its border security capabilities, in part with training and equipment provided by various U.S. as

- We understand that Armenian border guards and customs officials work together with their colleagues in Georgia, and we encourage you to conti

- Armenia possesses radiation portal monitors at five of its ports of entry (POEs), with four of these being installed by the Department of Ene

- The SLD Program is also working to install radiation portal monitors at the Zvartnots Airport in 2008 and working with Customs to develop an

-- We believe that the primary ways in which Armenia,s capabilities to detect nuclear trafficking could be enhanced include the following:

- Armenia should work with its U.S. and other international partners to provide radiation detection equipment at remaining POEs.

- We encourage Armenia to work with the U.S. and other international partners to identify and prioritize other equipment needs for improving bc

- To maximize the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment, customs officials and border guards using it must be adequately trained on pr

- We encourage the relevant agencies in Armenia to incorporate training on the detection of and response to WMD incidents into their individual

- Armenian law enforcement officers may also benefit from additional equipment and training in order to strengthen their ability to detect and

- Improving monitoring and control of green border areas between established points of entry would diminish the likelihood that smugglers could

-- Next, let's turn to Armenia,s strengths in responding to detected incidents of nuclear smuggling. We understand them to be the following:

- Armenia signed into law an operational plan for responding to the detection of nuclear or radioactive materials by a radiation portal monitor
- The Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Agency has two regional offices with basic capabilities to respond in case of a nuclear smuggling incident.
- Armenia has adequate storage capacity at its Radon to ensure that recovered nuclear and radioactive materials can be secured, so that they can
- Armenia has a strong legal basis for prosecuting nuclear smuggling, as outlined in its official report on compliance with UN Security Council
- We believe Armenia's ability to respond to detected incidents could be enhanced by the following:
- We encourage Armenia to review its operational plan for responding to the detection of nuclear or radioactive materials by a radiation portal
- We encourage Armenia to develop broader operational plans for responding to all possible illicit trafficking incidents, not only those identified
- Armenia should seek to enhance its nuclear forensics capability. Nuclear forensics supports prosecution of nuclear smugglers and can be used
- As a deterrent to future potential traffickers, we encourage Armenia to prosecute all illicit nuclear and radioactive trafficking and scam cases
- Lastly, comprehensive reporting of all cases to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database Program would improve understanding of illicit trafficking
- Finally, there is one aspect that applies across the board to the effort to combat nuclear smuggling, and that is corruption.
- We perceive that corruption remains a significant hindrance to Armenia's anti-trafficking efforts, as it does throughout the world. Corrupt
- We believe that further efforts to address the problem of corruption hold the potential to significantly enhance Armenia's success in combating

6.(U) DELEGATION ROSTERS U.S. Delegation

1. Michael Stafford) State Department
2. Brent Eastman) State Department
3. Natalie Hardwick) State Department
4. Natasha Trueblood) State Department
5. Christian Wright) State Department
6. Brent Bredehøft) Department of Homeland Security
7. Anne Kohnen) Department of Energy
8. Scott Roecker) Department of Energy Armenian Delegation
1. Varduhi Asaturian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2. Liudmila Shahinyan, Export Control Commission
3. Vahe Demirchyan, Ministry of Justice
4. Sona Avanesyan, Ministry of Justice
5. Aida Avetisyan, Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
6. Alexander Stepanyan, Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
7. Gevorg Mkrtchian, Customs State Committee
8. Elmen Tsarukyan, Customs State Committee
9. Arman Avagyan, Armenian Rescue Service
10. Levon Avagyan, Ministry of Defense
11. Susanna Grigoryan, Ministry of Defense
12. Hakob Babayan, General Prosecutors Office
13. Aram Amirzadyan, General Prosecutors Office
14. Tigran Aghajanian, National Security Service
15. Suren Baghdasaryan, National Security Service
16. Manuk Amiryan, Border Guards 17. Tovmas Darbinyan Border Guards 18. Vovik Atoian, Armenian Nuclear Power Plant 19. Ashot Karapetyan, Armer
1. Paolo Peerani, Joint Research Centre, Ipra
2. Andre von Zweidorf, Joint Research Centre, Ipra International Atomic Energy Agency Scott Purvis, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security